Israel’s Election Deadlock Leaves Security Policy Intact

Ra’am’s eight incoming lawmakers brought Gadi Eisenkot’s support to 56 seats, but neither he nor Benjamin Netanyahu had the 61 needed for a majority in the 120-seat Knesset. The arithmetic has made Arab parties decisive in government formation; the bloc seeking to replace Netanyahu has still resisted including them. The election’s numbers may change who manages the state. They haven’t pointed to a fundamental change in its security policy toward Palestinians.

The coalition arithmetic

The election was held on October 27, 2026. Netanyahu’s Likud Party and coalition partners won 53 seats, while the opposition bloc led by Eisenkot won 48, according to an opinion article by Ahmet Arda Şensoy. Arab parties won 19 seats. With Arab members, anti-Netanyahu parties theoretically had 67, but Eisenkot and his allies opposed both a national unity government with Netanyahu and including Arab parties in their government.

Ra’am said it would recommend Eisenkot for prime minister, giving him the larger number of recommendations described in the reporting. President Isaac Herzog chooses whom to ask to form a coalition. If Herzog appoints Eisenkot, he could have up to 42 days to do so. A recommendation is not a majority, and Ra’am’s support hasn’t resolved the impasse: Eisenkot had pledged before the election not to include the party in his government.

Yisrael Beytenu’s Avigdor Liberman had vowed not to support a minority government, though his party was meeting with Herzog and had committed to recommend Eisenkot. The opposition bloc hadn’t persuaded a party from Netanyahu’s bloc to join it. Liberman also opposed a government dependent on Arab-party support. In Haaretz commentary, Ravit Hecht wrote that Liberman was sending conflicting signals, while other figures in the bloc believed he would eventually fall in line.

A change in managers

Eisenkot was also seeking an agreement with ultra-Orthodox Haredi parties, despite the opposition campaign’s pledge to end military-service exemptions for Haredim. No agreement had been reached, and the Haredi parties faced difficulty abandoning their long-standing alliance with Netanyahu. Zvi Bar’el wrote in Haaretz that a “bloc of change” seeking to dismantle the judicial overhaul couldn’t keep treating the Jewish majority as the country’s sole owner. He described the bloc’s choices as a “poisonous menu” of campaign-promise violations.

Şensoy’s account said many voters wanted security policies similar to those established under Netanyahu, but without Netanyahu and his far-right allies. Eisenkot’s alternative was described as a more institutional and predictable management of Israel’s security-centered strategy, not a fundamental change in policy toward Palestine. He opposed establishing a Palestinian state and supported eliminating Hamas’s military and political capabilities.

If Netanyahu stayed in power, Israel’s security approach in Gaza was expected to continue. An Eisenkot-led government would also make eliminating Hamas a main objective. The account said military pressure on Gaza was unlikely to end and a comprehensive process toward an independent Palestinian state was unlikely to begin under either scenario. West Bank policy could differ: Netanyahu’s far-right allies supported settlement expansion and annexation, while an Eisenkot-led government might take a more controlled approach in response to international pressure. Bennett and Liberman, however, could make a policy recognizing Palestinian sovereignty difficult.

The security apparatus in the room

A Haaretz analysis by Yossi Verter said the path to a government that could unseat Netanyahu remained long and uncertain. It described Shin Bet chief David Zini as seeking another election to buy time to root out dissent within the agency, and said Netanyahu viewed him as key to delegitimizing Arab parties and thwarting the opposition’s next moves in the Knesset. The article’s headline called Zini’s conduct “war on democracy from the inside.”

The election also landed amid U.S. congressional midterms and a crisis over Trump administration policy toward Iran. Şensoy wrote that a new attack could push Israel’s coalition crisis aside and refocus politics on national security, potentially strengthening Netanyahu’s argument that his leadership was necessary. Iranian retaliation, economic costs, an unsuccessful operation, or a U.S. preference for diplomacy could instead weaken him or limit U.S. support. A caretaker government could remain during negotiations; if another early election were called, uncertainty could last around six months.

Outside Eisenkot’s home in Herzliya on October 29, protesters urged him to form a coalition with Israel-Arab parties rather than allow Netanyahu another term. Their demand met a political arithmetic in which Arab parties held decisive seats, while the leading opposition bloc still resisted bringing them into government.